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THE USE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS TO IMPEACH THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE DEFENDANT IN PENNSYLVANIA
In all Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, the admission of prior crimes of a
defendant for the purpose of showing a disposition in the accused to commit
crime is prohibited.1 Wigmore states that "the doing of one act is itself no
evidence that the same or like act was again done by the same person has been
so often judicially repeated that it is a commonplace."'2 In Pennsylvania, "[ilt
is a general rule that a distinct crime, unconnected with that laid in the
indictment, cannot be given in evidence against the prisoner."13 Quoting
Wigmore, the court in Commonwealth v. Boulden explained this exclusionary
policy :4
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal-whether judge
or jury-is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of the
crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on
the present charge, or to take proof of it as justifying a condemna-
tion irrespective of the present charge.5
However, there are numerous exceptions to the general rule, most of
which fall within the principle that prior crimes are admissible if they are
independently relevant to establish guilt. A prior crime may relate to the
substantive merits of the case, performing such functions as neutralizing the
defenses of accident, mistake or lack of guilty knowledge, establishing motive,
showing plan, system or habit, or proving identity."
Even though a prior crime may not be independently relevant to the
substantive merits of the case, the previous conviction may be alluded to
for the ostensible purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility. Of
course, these convictions could not be introduced if the defendant were not
1. This is not the practice in continental jurisdictions, 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 193
(3d ed. 1940). "The rule of exclusion thus expounded is so firmly established that it
would be held to prevail even in jurisdictions where no express enunciation of it has
been made." Id. § 194.
2. Id. § 192.
3. Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72 Pa. 60, 65 (1872).
4. 1 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 194; Commonwealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa.
Super. 328, 116 A.2d 867 (1955).
5. Id. at 333, 116 A.2d at 869.
6. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 148, 160 Atl. 602, 606 (1932),
the supreme court listed "many well recognized exceptions."
Prior convictions can be admitted in evidence to show intent, scienter, motive,
identity, plan, or the accused to be one of an organization banded together to
commit crimes of the sort charged, or that such prior conviction or criminal act
formed a part of a chain, or was one of the sequence of acts, or became part
of the history of the event on trial, or became part of the natural development
of facts; also to prove mental condition when the defense was insanity or to
rebut the inference of mistake, or to show guilty knowledge. ...
For a more recent and well delineated study of the exceptions, see Commonwealth v.
Boulden, supra note 4.
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to testify in his own behalf, but "[w]hen a party becomes a witness for
himself, he stands in no better position than other witnesses not a party."'7
It is the purpose of this paper to describe and to evaluate the manner in
which prior convictions are admissible in Pennsylvania solely for the purpose
of impeaching the accused's credibility. Emphasis has been placed on the
following issues: (1) what crimes are relevant to the question of credibility;
(2) in what manner may this type of evidence be introduced; and (3) what
modifications should be made in the present Pennsylvania rules.
Prior bad acts are not admissible to impeach credibility ;8 there must
have been a crime resulting in a conviction.9 The court said in Commonwealth
v. Arcurio that a judge should not "permit a question to the witness as to
whether he has ever been arrested, incarcerated, or indicted. These facts
are immaterial, for even innocent persons are arrested and subject to
indictment." 10  However, most courts treat a plea of nolo contendere as
being equivalent to a guilty plea and admit evidence of a conviction wherein
the defendant made such a plea." The fact that the accused has been pardoned
after a conviction for-a previous crime will not prevent the admission of the
record, but the defendant will then be allowed to show his pardon.' 2
But not all crimes are relevant to the issue of credibility. "[T]he only
crimes admissible to attack veracity are such as affect credibility and refer
to the conviction of a felony or misdemeanor in the nature of 'crimen falsi.' ,,l
In Commonwealth v. Gold,'4 the defendant contended that "in the nature of
'crimen falsi'" modified a felony as well as a misdemeanor, but the court
replied:
Felonies of whatever character, being infamous crimes, stand in a
class by themselves, but not every misdemeanor, only misdemeanors
in the nature of "crimen falsi," carry with them a cloud upon the
veracity of the defendant, as a witness whose credibility is attacked
by the record of conviction.' 5
Thus, the court reasoned, a previous conviction for larceny could be used
to impeach Gold's credibility. As "crimen falsi" describes the relevant
misdemeanors, Commonwealth v. Schambers"6 held that a defendant accused
7. Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 272, 145 Atl. 89, 92 (1928).
8. Commonwealth v. Williams, 209 Pa. 529, 58 Atl. 922 (1904).
9. Commonwealth v. Quaranta, supra note 7, at 273, 145 Atl. at 93; Commonwealth
v. Wiswesser, 124 Pa. Super. 251, 188 At. 604 (1936).
10. 92 Pa. Super. 404, 415 (1927).
11. See Annot., 146 A.L.R. 867 (1943).
12. Supra note 7, at 274, 145 Atl. at 93; see Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 893 (1953).
13. Supra note 7, at 273, 145 AtI. at 93; Melangro v. United States, 88 F.2d 264
(3d Cir. 1937) (applying Pennsylvania law).
14. 155 Pa. Super. 364, 38 A.2d 486 (1944).
15. Id. at 371, 38 A.2d at 489.
16. 110 Pa. Super. 61, 167 Atl. 645 (1933).
[Vol. 66
of unlawfully possessing and transporting liquor could not be impeached by
a prior conviction for the same crime. According to the superior court, mis-
demeanors "in the nature of 'crimen falsi' " are those crimes which dis-
qualified a person as a witness at common law. The court gave as examples:
.. .forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, suppression of testi-
mony by bribery or conspiracy to procure the absence of a witness,
barratry, the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the
prejudice of another man's legal right .... 17
When the defendant testifies, the crimes relevant to any witness's
credibility may be used to impeach the accused's veracity, but the manner
in which this evidence may be introduced is more limited. In 1884, Buck v.
Commonwealth'8 held that evidence of prior convictions could not be adduced
on cross-examination of the defendant, but in 1909, that decision was over-
ruled by Commonwealth v. Racco,19 when the court stated: "Under our
statute permitting him to testify no restriction was placed upon the limit
of his cross-examination. '20 As a result of the Racco decision, prosecutors
were tempted to examine defendants concerning prior convictions without
knowing the answers to their questions. As the court in Commonwealth v.
Doe2l stated:
It was not an infrequent occurrence that such inquiry was made
where there was neither the ability nor the expectation of proving the
fact suggested if it were denied by the defendant and it is undoubtedly
true that the mere asking of the question would excite the suspicions
of jurors and create a prejudice against the defendant even if he
denied the implication.
2 2
In 1911, the legislature passed the following act to prevent this practice
prejudicial to the defendant :23
Hereafter any person charged with any crime, and called as a witness
in his own behalf, shall not be asked, and, if asked, shall not be re-
quired to answer, any question tending to show that he has com-
mitted or been charged with, or been convicted of any offense other
that the one wherewith he shall then be charged, or tending to show
that he has been of bad character or reputation; unless,-
One. He shall have at such trial, personally or by his advocate,
17. Id. at 64, 167 Atl. at 646. One convicted of perjury is not a competent witness,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4322 (1945) ; see Commonwealth v. Mueller, 153 Pa. Super.
524, 34 A.2d 321 (1943).
18. 107 Pa. 486 (1884).
19. 225 Pa. 113, 73 Atl. 1067 (1909). The law prior to 1911 is clearly explained
in Commonwealth v. Doe, 79 Pa. Super. 162 (1922).
20. Commonwealth v. Racco, supra note 19, at 116, 73 Atl. at 1067.
21. Commonwealth v. Doe, supra note 19.
22. Id. at 168.
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1930).
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asked questions of the witness for the prosecution with a view to
establish his own good reputation or character, or has given evidence
tending to prove his own good character or reputation; or,
Two. He shall have testified at such trial against a co-defendant,
charged with the same offense.
The Pennsylvania act was modeled after a similar English statute, but it
was not copied verbatim. 24 The English version was construed to apply to
both cross-examination and the admissibility of extrinsic evidence 25 and
it made an express exception for crimes independently relevant to prove the
guilt of the accused. 26 In Pennsylvania, the courts have construed the act
as implying such an exception, 27 but have limited the scope of the statute
to cross-examination. 28 However, the crime may not be shown by merely
24. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36. The significant provision
of the Act was the following section:
(f) A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall not
be asked, and if asked, shall not be required to answer, any question tending
to show that he has committed or been convicted of or been charged with
any offense other than that wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad
character, unless-
(i) the proof that he has committed or been convicted of such other
offense is admissible evidence to show that he is guilty of the offense
wherewith he is then charged; or
(ii) he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses
for the prosecution with a view to establishing his own good charac-
ter, or has given evidence of his good character, or the nature or
conduct of the defense is such as to involve imputations on the
character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution; or
(iii) he has given evidence against any other person charged with the
same offense.
25. Barker v. Arnold, [1911] 2 K.B. 120. The majority of the states allow cross-
examination of a defendant concerning prior convictions for the purpose of impeaching his
credibility. Most of them permit it by statute. The only state prohibiting it without a
statute is Illinois; People v. Grizzle, 381 Ill. 278, 44 N.E.2d 917 (1942). See Annotations:
6 A.L.R. 1608 (1920), 25 A.L.R. 339 (1923), 103 A.L.R. 350 (1936), and 161 A.L.R. 233
(1946).
26. Supra note 24, § (i). Pennsylvania's omission of this section led Wigmore to
say: "On first reading this Statute, the suspicious thought intrudes itself that it had
been devised by some representative of the underworld." 1 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 194b.
27. See note 6 supra.
28. In Commonwealth v. Dorst, 285 Pa. 232, 132 AtI. 168 (1926), the defendant
claimed that the reason and spirit of the act should prohibit the prosecution from pro-
ducing the record of a prior conviction in order to impeach the defendant's credibility.
However, the supreme court stressed the title of the act, "An Act Regulating in criminal
trials the cross-examination of a defendant when testifying in his own behalf," and
replied that the act did not apply to extrinsic evidence. It also cited Commonwealth v.
Doe, supra note 19; Commonwealth v. Pezzner, 78 Pa. Super. 286 (1922) ; and Com-
monwealth v. Vis, 81 Pa. Super. 384 (1923), which had pointed out that before the
enactment of the statute, records of previous convictions were admissible and if that
practice had been intended to be eliminated, the statute should have expressly prohibited
it. Finally at 239, 132 At. at 170, the court said:
To deny to the commonwealth the right to traverse the defendant's proffer of
himself in this regard by showing that he is not worthy of credit because in-
famous by judicial finding would be tilting the scales against the common-
wealth where they should be held even.
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placing a rebuttal witness on the stand. A prior conviction may only be
introduced by producing the record or an exemplified copy;29 "[i]t is the
highest and best evidence." 30
The Act of 1911 contains two exceptions which allow the prosecution
to cross-examine the defendant about his prior convictions for the purpose
of impeaching his credibility: (1) if he puts his character into issue,8 '
and (2) if he testifies against a co-defendant.3 2 Typical applications of
the first exception are to be found in Commonwealth v. Garanchoskie,3
where cross-examination was allowed after the defendant had called various
character witnesses, and in Commonwealth v. Lisowski,8 4 where the defendant
testified as to his good character and was cross-examined concerning a
previous conviction for assault and battery.85 The second exception has not
been construed.
In addition to the express exceptions, it has been held that the accused
can lose the benefits of the act by the manner in which his defense is con-
ducted before or during the time he is a witness. An opening address by the
defendant's counsel which admits certain previous criminal acts by the
accused waives the right of the defendant to invoke the statute, 0 and the
admission of prior convictions on direct examination permits the prosecutor
to ask the defendant about other crimes to which he has not alluded. 7 The
courts reason that one should not be allowed to give the appearance of
making a clean breast of prior misconduct when actually he has told half
of the story3
8
Thus the Act of 1911 merely protects the defendant from the irrespon-
sible questions alluded to in the Doe case.8 9 It does not prevent the admission
of extrinsic evidence of prior crimes to impeach the accused's credibility, and
in certain circumstances the defendant can be subject to unfair interrogation.
It is submitted that this phase of criminal procedure is unnecessarily and
unduly prejudicial to the defendant.
Where a previous conviction is admitted for the purpose of testing
veracity, it is said that such evidence may not affect the substantive merits of
29. Commonwealth v. Anthony, 91 Pa. Super. 518, 521 (1927).
30. Supra note 10, at 410.
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 711(1) (1930).
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 711(2) (1930).
33. 251 Pa. 247, 96 Atl. 513 (1916).
34. 274 Pa. 222, 117 AtI. 794 (1922).
35. See Commonwealth v. Yeager, 329 Pa. 81, 196 Atd. 827 (1938) ; Common-
wealth v. Comer, 167 Pa. Super. 537, 76 A.2d 233 (1950) ; and Commonwealth v.
Wiswesser, supra note 9.
36. Commonwealth v. Garrison, 398 Pa. 47, 157 A.2d 75 (1959); Commonwealth
v. Farley, 168 Pa. Super. 204, 77 A.2d 881 (1951).
37. Commonwealth v. Quaranta, supra note 7.
38. Ibid.
39. Commonwealth v. Doe, ntpra note 19, at 168.
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the case. The fact of the conviction serves only to judge the witness's
credibility.40 Not only is the jury expected to compartmentalize the evidence
it receives, but it is presumed to have done so. However, presumptions do not
always reflect reality. Even though a juror makes a determined effort to
effect such a classification of legal concepts, he may well be subconsciously
influenced by "the natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal ... to give
excessive weight to the . . . [accused's] record. '41 It is quite probable that
the jury will consider evidence of a prior conviction as proof of a disposition
in the accused to commit crime. The prejudice to the defendant is apparent.
Thus, unless such evidence is a necessary tool for impeaching the
accused's veracity, it should not be admitted even though it may have some
probative value. But the use of prior convictions is not necessary to impeach
a defendant's credibility. The defendant's temptation to lie in order to escape
punishment does not go unnoticed by the jury. Since the accused's veracity
is questioned by the jury in the absence of knowledge of prior convictions,
that knowledge serves little useful purpose. If there is any value in such
evidence, it is certainly outweighed by its tendency to prejudice the de-
fendant's right to be judged on the substantive merits of his case.
Even if certain prior crimes have a probative value in ascertaining the
veracity of the witness which outweighs the prejudice to the defendant,
Pennsylvania has not adopted a logical classification of crimes for the
purpose of testing credibility. As all felonies and those misdemeanors "in
the nature of 'crimen falsi' " are relevant to credibility, it is no wonder that
the prosecutor in Commonwealth v; Wiswesser felt it permissible to ask the
defendant if he had committed any crimes in the past.42 There may be a
reasonable basis for the inclusion of certain misdemeanors in a list of crimes
affecting credibility. Those listed in the Schambers43 case tend to show the
witness's attitude toward the sanctity of the judicial process. A crime such as
subornation of perjury is one which not only shows that the witness has
been dishonest in the past, but that his dishonesty was a complete disrespect
for the obligation of the oath. Less clear is the case where the conviction
pertains to a lack of veracity outside the courtroom, i.e., crimes such as
embezzlement, larceny by bailee and obtaining money by false pretenses.
44
These crimes relate to dishonesty in general, not to an attitude toward the
judiciary or the oath. Still of less probative value is a previous conviction for
a crime such as rape. Although at common law, "a person of such depravity of
nature as permitted him to be guilty of a serious crime was not worthy of
40. Commonwealth v. Davis, 396 Pa. 158, 150 A.2d 863 (1959).
41. 1 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 194.
42. Su pra note 9.
43. Commonwealth v. Schambers, 225 Pa. 113, 73 Atl. 1067 (1909).
44. Commonwealth v. Vis, supra note 28.
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credit and was incapable of making such contribution to the truth in any
judicial inquiry as was entitled to consideration, '45 a previous conviction for
rape46 should have no more significance in ascertaining the veracity of a
witness than a prior conviction for the illegal possession of liquor. 47 While
the court in Commonwealth v. Schambers48 held that a prior conviction for
"bootlegging" had no probative value on the issue of the defendant's
credibility, it implied that a valid distinction between crimes mala in se and
crimes mala prohibita could be made. 49 Whether or not the prior crime
is relevant to a witness's veracity should not be dependent upon whether it
was morally wrong, but upon whether the crime was of such a nature that the
witness has shown a tendency not to respect the obligation to tell the truth
when he is testifying.
In short, those crimes which society considers most heinous have less
probative value in ascertaining veracity than certain misdemeanors. At first
glance, such a classification appears at least anomalous. It is probably the
apparent absurdity of the classification that led to the rule admitting all
felonies, but only certain misdemeanors. However, when relating past crimes
to the question of veracity, one is not concerned with the danger of the crime
to society in general, but with the danger to the validity of the judicial process.
One cannot expect the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to modify the
present rules concerning prior convictions admitted to impeach the defendant's
credibility. The vast body of case law decided since 1911 on this subject
provides such extensive authority for the court's present position that it
would be difficult for the court to change its point of view. Only recently it
said:
If a defendant offers himself as a person worthy of belief, the jury
has a right to know what kind of man he is-to aid in assessing his
credibility. His previous record is admissible for this purpose ...
The "Split-Verdict" Act of 1959 . .. did not intend to, nor did it,
change this long established rule.50
Therefore, if a change is to be made, it seems that it must be done by the
legislature."' Rule 21 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence entitled "Limitations
45. Commonwealth v. Doe, supra note 19, at 166-67.
46. Commonwealth v. Garner, 35 Lanc. L. Rev. 373 (Pa. 1918).
47. Commonwealth v. Schambers, supra note 43.
48. Ibid.
49. Id. at 64, 167 Atl. at 646.
50. Commonwealth v. Butler, 405 Pa. 36, 47, 173 A.2d 468, 474 (1961).
51. In 1947, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed an act for just this purpose,
Pa. Laws 1947, act 1239, § 1, but it was ruled unconstitutional in Commonwealth v.
DePofi, 362 Pa. 229, 66 A.2d 649 (1949). The court reasoned: (1) the title did not
give sufficient notice of the contents of the Act; (2) the contents contained more than
one subject; and (3) the wording of the Act was ambiguous.
1962) NO TES
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
on Evidence of Conviction of Crime as Affecting Credibility" could be used
as a model.5 2 It provides:
Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime not involving
dishonesty or false statement shall be inadmissible for the purpose
of impairing his credibility. If the witness be the accused in a
criminal proceeding, no evidence of his conviction for a crime shall
be admissible for the sole purpose of impairing his credibility unless
he has first introduced evidence admissible solely for the purpose of
supporting his credibility.
According to Rule 21, there is a standard for the ordinary witness and
a separate standard for the defendant-witness in a criminal proceeding. Un-
less the defendant makes his credibility an issue, no record of any crime, in-
cluding perjury,5 3 is admissible for the sole purpose of impeaching his
credibility. It is important to emphasize that the test is not whether the
defendant puts his reputation in issue, but whether he places his credibility
in issue. If the accused acts so as to lose the benefits of his special position,
he can be impeached by the showing of prior convictions, but they must
involve "dishonesty or false statement." No exception has been made for the
defendant who testifies against a co-defendant.
As another alternative, Pennsylvania could apply the provisions of
Rule 21 concerning ordinary witnesses to a defendant-witness. This ap-
proach would allow the prosecution to introduce prior convictions of felonies
such as obtaining money by false pretenses and misdemeanors in the nature
of "crimen falsi." It would be a compromise between the present Penn-
sylvania position and the one taken by the Uniform Rules.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence have been approved by the American
Bar Association, the American Law Institute, and the Pennsylvania Bar
Association.54 In a supplement to the Report of the Committee on Judicial
Administration of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, it is stated:
This provision, however, cannot be evaluated without considering
the section governing the privilege of the accused not to be called
as a witness and not to testify. Rule 23(4) permits counsel to com-
ment on the accused's failure to take the stand and to dispel any
doubt, further provides that "the trier of fact may draw all reasonable
52. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 21. "Rule 21 appears to be modeled closely after
the 1947 Act approved by the Pennsylvania Legislature, but subsequently held un-
constitutional for highly technical reasons, albeit remedial deficiencies.... ." Levin,
The Impact of the Uniform Rules of Evidence on Pennsylvania Law, 26 PA. B. A. Q.
216, 223 (1955).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4322 (1945).
54. Committee on Judicial Administration, Report on the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence, 26 PA. B. A. Q. 213 (1955). "It is believed that the proposed Uniform Rules are
wholly sane and workable and that their adoption will materially improve the function-
ing of our legal processes." Ibid.
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inferences therefrom." In short the draftsmen have attempted to
encourage testimony by the accused in the interest of fuller develop-
ment of all relevant evidence. To accomplish this without undue
prejudice to the accused they have rendered him immune from attack
by proof of prior convictions regardless of whether the ostensible
theory of such attack relates to his credibility as a witness or to his
role as defendant.")
Although the presence of Rule 23(4) and the general policy of the rules
made the present approach of Rule 21 necessary in order to protect the
defendant, the absence in Pennsylvania of a rule permitting the prosecutor
to comment on the accused's failure to take the stand, merely reduces the
immediate incentive to enact something comparable to Rule 21; it certainly
does not extinguish the need for some legislation in this field.
Whether or not the legislature desires to accept completely the policy
of Rule 21, it should limit in some way the use of prior convictions to
impeach the credibility of the defendant. Inasmuch as misdemeanors in
the nature of "crimen falsi" probably have little prejudicial effect on the
substantive merits of the case and have some probative value in ascertaining
the veracity of a witness, they could be admissible as a compromise. The
Act of 1911 was enacted merely to stop an unfair practice arising as a
result of the Racco decision. Pennsylvania, in accordance with the Uniform
Rules, should adopt a policy pertaining to all evidence, not merely cross-
examination.
MARX S. LEOPOLD
55. Levin, supra note 52, at 223.
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